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Evolutionarily Stable Spectrum Access
Xu Chen, Student Member, IEEE, and Jianwei Huang, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—In this paper, we design distributed spectrum access
mechanisms with both complete and incomplete network infor-
mation. We propose an evolutionary spectrum access mechanism
with complete network information, and show that the mecha-
nism achieves an equilibrium that is globally evolutionarily stable.
With incomplete network information, we propose a distributed
learning mechanism, where each user utilizes local observations
to estimate the expected throughput and learns to adjust its
spectrum access strategy adaptively over time. We show that
the learning mechanism converges to the same evolutionary
equilibrium on the time average. Numerical results show that the
proposed mechanisms achieve up to 35% performance improve-
ment over the distributed reinforcement learning mechanism in
the literature, and are robust to the perturbations of users’
channel selections.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cognitive radio is envisioned as a promising technique
to alleviate the problem of spectrum under-utilization [1]. It
enables unlicensed wireless users (secondary users) to oppor-
tunistically access the licensed channels owned by spectrum
holders (primary users), and thus can significantly improve the
spectrum efficiency [2].
A key challenge of the cognitive radio technology is how
to share the spectrum resources efficiently in a distributed
fashion. A common modeling approach is to consider self-
ish secondary users, and model their interactions as non-
cooperative games (e.g., [3]–[8]). Liu and Wu in [5] modeled
the interactions among spatially separated secondary users as
congestion games with resource reuse. Elias et al. in [6] stud-
ied the competitive spectrum access by multiple interference-
sensitive secondary users. Nie and Comniciu in [7] designed
a self-enforcing distributed spectrum access mechanism based
on potential games. Law et al. in [8] studied the price of
anarchy of spectrum access game, and showed that users’
selfish choices may significantly degrade system performance.
A common assumption of the above results is that each user
knows the complete network information. This is, however,
often expensive or infeasible to achieve due to significant
signaling overhead and the competitiors’ unwillingness to
share information.
Another common assumption of all the above work is
that secondary users are fully rational and thus often adopt
their channel selections based on best responses, i.e., the best
choices they can compute by having the complete network
information. To have full rationality, a user needs to have a
high computational power to collect and analyze the network
information in order to predict other users’ behaviors. This is
often not feasible due to the limitations of today’s wireless
devices.
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Another body of related work focused on the design of
spectrum access mechanisms assuming bounded rationality of
secondary users, i.e., each user tries to improve its strategy
adaptively over time. Chen and Huang in [9] designed an
imitation-based spectrum access mechanism by letting sec-
ondary users imitate other users’ successful channel selections.
When not knowing the channel selections of other users,
secondary users need to learn the environment and adapt the
channel selection decisions accordingly. Authors in [10], [11]
used no-regret learning to solve this problem, assuming that
the users’ channel selections are common information. The
learning converges to a correlated equilibrium [12], wherein
the common observed history serves as a signal to coordinate
all users’ channel selections. When users’ channel selections
are not observable, authors in [13]–[15] designed multi-agent
multi-armed bandit learning algorithm to minimize the ex-
pected performance loss of distributed spectrum access. Li
in [16] applied reinforcement learning to analyze Aloha-type
spectrum access.
In this paper, we propose a new framework of distributed
spectrum access with and without complete network informa-
tion (i.e., channel statistics and user selections). The common
characteristics of algorithms under this framework is also
bounded rationality, which requires much less computation
power than the full rationality case, and thus may better match
the reality of wireless communications. We first propose an
evolutionary game approach for distributed spectrum access
with the complete network information, where each secondary
user takes a comparison strategy (i.e., comparing its payoff
with the system average payoff) to evolve its spectrum access
decision over time. We then propose a learning mechanism
for distributed spectrum access with incomplete information,
which does not require any prior knowledge of channel statis-
tics or information exchange among users. In this case, each
secondary user estimates its expected throughput locally, and
learns to adjust its channel selection strategy adaptively.
The main results and contributions of this paper are as
follows:
• Evolutionary spectrum access mechanism: we formulate
the distributed spectrum access over multiple heteroge-
neous time-varying licensed channels as an evolutionary
spectrum access game, and study the evolutionary dy-
namics of spectrum access.
• Evolutionary dynamics and stability: we show that the
evolutionary spectrum access mechanism converges to
the evolutionary equilibrium, and prove that it is globally
evolutionarily stable.
• Learning mechanism with incomplete information: we
further propose a learning mechanism without the knowl-
edge of channel statistics and user information exchange.
We show that the learning mechanism converges to the
2same evolutionary equilibrium on the time average.
• Superior performance: we show that the proposed mech-
anisms can achieve up to 35% performance improvement
over the distributed reinforcement learning mechanism in
literature, and are robust to the perturbations of users’
channel selections.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce
the system model in Section II. After briefly reviewing the
evolutionary game theory in Section III, we present the evolu-
tionary spectrum access mechanism with complete information
in Section IV. Then we introduce the learning mechanism
in Section V. We illustrate the performance of the proposed
mechanisms through numerical results in Section VI and
finally conclude in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a cognitive radio network with a set M =
{1, 2, ...,M} of independent and stochastically heterogeneous
licensed channels. A set N = {1, 2, ..., N} of secondary
users try to opportunistically access these channels, when the
channels are not occupied by primary (licensed) transmissions.
The system model has a slotted transmission structure as in
Figure 1 and is described as follows.
• Channel State: the channel state for a channel m at time
slot t is
Sm(t) =


0, if channel m is occupied by
primary transmissions,
1, if channel m is idle.
• Channel State Changing: for a channel m, we assume that
the channel state is an i.i.d. Bernoulli random variable,
with an idle probability θm ∈ (0, 1) and a busy probabil-
ity 1−θm. This model can be a good approximation of the
reality if the time slots for secondary transmissions are
sufficiently long or the primary transmissions are highly
bursty [17]. Numerical results show that the proposed
mechanisms also work well in the Markovian channel
environment.
• Heterogeneous Channel Throughput: if a channel m is
idle, the achievable data rate bm(t) by a secondary user
in each time slot t evolves according to an i.i.d. random
process with a mean Bm, due to the local environmental
effects such fading. For example, in a frequency-selective
Rayleigh fading channel environment we can compute the
channel data rate according to the Shannon capacity with
the channel gain at a time slot being a realization of a
random variable that follows the exponential distribution
[18].
• Time Slot Structure: each secondary user n executes the
following stages synchronously during each time slot:
– Channel Sensing: sense one of the channels based on
the channel selection decision generated at the end
of previous time slot. Access the channel if it is idle.
– Channel Contention: use a backoff mechanism to
resolve collisions when multiple secondary users
access the same idle channel. The contention stage
Fig. 1. Multiple stages in a single time slot.
of a time slot is divided into λmax mini-slots1 (see
Figure 1), and user n executes the following two
steps. First, count down according to a randomly and
uniformly chosen integral backoff time (number of
mini-slots) λn between 1 and λmax. Second, once
the timer expires, transmit RTS/CTS messages if the
channel is clear (i.e., no ongoing transmission). Note
that if multiple users choose the same backoff value
λn, a collision will occur with RTS/CTS transmis-
sions and no users can successfully grab the channel.
– Data Transmission: transmit data packets if the
RTS/CTS message exchanges go through and the
user successfully grabs the channel.
– Channel Selection: in the complete information case,
users broadcast the chosen channel IDs to other users
through a common control channel2, and then make
the channel selection decisions based on the evolu-
tionary spectrum access mechanism (details in Sec-
tion IV). With incomplete information, users update
the channel estimations based on the current access
results, and make the channel selection decisions
according to the distributed learning mechanism (de-
tails in Section V).
Suppose that km users choose an idle channel m to access.
Then the probability that a user n (out of the km users) grabs
the channel m is
g(km) = Pr{λn < min
i6=n
{λi}}
=
λmax∑
λ=1
Pr{λn = λ}Pr{λ < min
i6=n
{λi}|λn = λ}
=
λmax∑
λ=1
1
λmax
(
λmax − λ
λmax
)km−1
,
which is a decreasing function of the number of total contend-
ing users km. Then the expected throughput of a secondary
user n choosing a channel m is given as
Un = θmBmg(km). (1)
For the ease of exposition, we will focus on the analysis
of the proposed spectrum access mechanisms in the many-
users regime. Numerical results show that our algorithms also
1For the ease of exposition, we assume that the contention backoff size
λmax is fixed. This corresponds to an equilibrium model for the case that
the backoff size λmax can be dynamically tuned according to the 802.11
distributed coordination function [19]. Also, we can enhance the performance
of the backoff mechanism by determining optimal fixed contention backoff
size according to the method in [20].
2Please refer to [21] for the details on how to set up and maintain a reliable
common control channel in cognitive radio networks.
3apply when the number of users is small (see Section VI-C
for the details). Since our analysis is from secondary users’
perspective, we will use terms “secondary user” and “user”
interchangeably.
III. OVERVIEW OF EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY
For the sake of completeness, we will briefly describe the
background of evolutionary game theory. Detailed introduction
can be found in [22]. Evolutionary game theory was first used
in biology to study the change of animal populations, and
then later applied in economics to model human behaviors.
It is most useful to understand how a large population of
users converge to Nash equilibria in a dynamic system [22].
A player in an evolutionary game has bounded rationality, i.e.,
limited computational capability and knowledge, and improves
its decisions as it learns about the environment over time [22].
The evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a key concept
to describe the evolutionary equilibrium. For simplicity, we
will introduce the ESS definition (the strict Nash equilibrium
in Definition 2, respectively) in the context of a symmetric
game where all users adopt the same strategy i at the ESS
(strict Nash equilibrium, respectively). The definition can be
(and will be) extended to the case of asymmetric game [22],
where we view the population’s collective behavior as a mixed
strategy i at the ESS (strict Nash equilibrium, respectively).
An ESS ensures the stability such that the population is
robust to perturbations by a small fraction of players. Suppose
that a small share ǫ of players in the population deviate to
choose a mutant strategy j, while all other players stick to the
incumbent strategy i. We denote the population state of the
game as x(1−ǫ)i+ǫj = (xi = 1− ǫ, xj = ǫ, xl = 0, ∀l 6= i, j),
where xa denotes the fraction of users choosing strategy
a, and the corresponding payoff of choosing strategy a as
R(a,x(1−ǫ)i+ǫj).
Definition 1 ([22]). A strategy i is an evolutionarily stable
strategy if for every strategy j 6= i, there exists an ǫ¯ ∈ (0, 1)
such that R(i,xǫj+(1−ǫ)i) > R(j,xǫj+(1−ǫ)i) for any j 6= i
and ǫ ∈ (0, ǫ¯).
Definition 1 means that the mutant strategy j cannot invade
the population when the perturbation is small enough, if the
incumbent strategy i is an ESS. It is shown in [22] that any
strict Nash equilibrium in noncooperative games is also an
ESS.
Definition 2 ([22]). A strategy i is a strict Nash equilibrium
if for every strategy j 6= i, it satisfies that R(i, i, ..., i) >
R(j, i, ..., i), where R(a, i, ..., i) denotes the payoff of choosing
strategy a ∈ {i, j} given other players adhering to the strategy
i.
To understand that a strict Nash is an ESS, we can set ǫ→ 0
in Definition 1, which leads to R(i,xi) > R(j,xi), ∀j 6= i,
i.e., given that almost all other players play the incumbent
strategy i, choosing any mutant strategy j 6= i will lead to a
loss in payoff.
Several recent results applied the evolutionary game theory
to study various networking problems. Niyato and Hossain in
Algorithm 1 Evolutionary Spectrum Access Mechanism
1: initialization:
2: set the global strategy adaptation factor α ∈ (0, 1].
3: select a random channel for each user.
4: end initialization
5: loop for each time slot t and each user n ∈ N in parallel:
6: sense and contend for the chosen channel and transmit
data packets if successfully grabbing the channel.
7: broadcast the chosen channel ID to other users
through a common control channel.
8: receive the information of other users’ channel selec-
tion and calculate the population state x(t).
9: compute the expected payoff Un(an,x(t)) and the
system average payoff U(x(t)) according to (2) and (3),
respectively.
10: if Un(an,x(t)) < U(x(t)) then
11: generate a random value δ according to a uniform
distribution on (0, 1).
12: if δ < α
xan (t)
(
1− Un(an,x(t))
U(x(t))
)
then
13: select a better channel m with probability
pm =
max {θmBmg(Nxm(t)) − U(x(t)), 0}∑M
m′=1 max {θm′Bm′g(Nxm′(t)) − U(x(t)), 0}
.
14: else select the original channel.
15: end if
16: end if
17: end loop
[17] investigated the evolutionary dynamics of heterogeneous
network selections. Zhang et al. in [23] designed incentive
schemes for resource-sharing in P2P networks based on the
evolutionary game theory. Wang et al. in [24] proposed
the evolutionary game approach for collaborative spectrum
sensing mechanism design in cognitive radio networks. Ac-
cording to Definition 1, the ESS obtained in [17], [23], [24]
is locally evolutionarily stable (i.e., the mutation ǫ is small
enough). Here we apply the evolutionary game theory to
design spectrum access mechanism, which can achieve global
evolutionary stability (i.e., the mutation ǫ can be arbitrarily
large).
IV. EVOLUTIONARY SPECTRUM ACCESS
We now apply the evolutionary game theory to design an
efficient and stable spectrum access mechanism with complete
network information. We will show that the spectrum access
equilibrium is an ESS, which guarantees that the spectrum
access mechanism is robust to random perturbations of users’
channel selections.
A. Evolutionary Game Formulation
The evolutionary spectrum access game is formulated as
follows:
• Players: the set of users N = {1, 2, ..., N}.
• Strategies: each user can access one of the set of channels
M = {1, 2, ...,M}.
4• Population state: the user distribution over M channels
at time t, x(t) = (xm(t), ∀m ∈M), where xm(t) is the
proportion of users selecting channel m at time t. We
have
∑
m∈M xm(t) = 1 for all t.
• Payoff: a user n’s expected throughput Un(an,x(t))
when choosing channel an ∈ M, given that the popu-
lation state is x(t). Since each user has the information
of channel statistics, from (1), we have
Un(an,x(t)) = θanBang(Nxan(t)). (2)
We also denote the system arithmetic average payoff
under population state x(t) as
U(x(t)) =
1
M
M∑
m=1
θmBmg(Nxm(t)). (3)
B. Evolutionary Dynamics
Based on the evolutionary game formulation above, we
propose an evolutionary spectrum access mechanism in Al-
gorithm 1 by reversing-engineering the replicator dynamics.
The idea is to let those users who have payoffs lower than
the system average payoff U(x(t) to select a better channel,
with a probability proportional to the (normalized) channel’s
“net fitness” θmBmg(Nxm(t)) − U(x(t)). We show that the
dynamics of channel selections in the mechanism can be
described with the evolutionary dynamics in (4). The proof
is given in the Appendix.
Theorem 1. For the evolutionary spectrum access mechanism
in Algorithm 1, the evolutionary dynamics are given as
x˙m(t) = α
(
Un(m,x(t))
U(x(t))
− 1
)
, ∀m ∈M, (4)
where the derivative is with respect to time t.
C. Evolutionary Equilibrium in Asymptotic Case λmax =∞
We next investigate the equilibrium of the evolutionary
spectrum access mechanism. To obtain useful insights, we first
focus on the asymptotic case where the number of backoff
mini-slots λmax goes to ∞, such that
g(k) = lim
λmax→∞
λmax∑
λ=1
1
λmax
(
λmax − λ
λmax
)k−1
= lim
1
λmax
→0
λmax−1∑
λ=0
(
λ
λmax
)k−1
1
λmax
=
∫ 1
0
zk−1dz =
1
k
. (5)
This is a good approximation when the number of mini-slots
λmax for backoff is much larger than the number of users
N and collisions rarely occur. In this case, Un(an,x(t)) =
θanBan
Nxm(t)
and U(x(t)) =
∑M
i=1 θiBi
N
. According to Theorem 1,
the evolutionary dynamics in (4) become
x˙m(t) = α
(
θmBm
xm(t)
1
M
∑M
i=1
θiBi
xi(t)
− 1
)
. (6)
From (6), we have
Theorem 2. The evolutionary spectrum access mechanism
in asymptotic case λmax = ∞ globally converges to the
evolutionary equilibrium x∗ =
(
x∗m =
θmBm∑
M
i=1 θiBi
, ∀m ∈ M
)
.
The proof is given in the Appendix. Theorem 2 implies that
Corollary 1. The evolutionary spectrum access mechanism
converges to the equilibrium x∗ such that users on different
channels achieve the same expected throughput, i.e.,
Un(m,x
∗) = Un(m
′,x∗), ∀m,m′ ∈ M. (7)
We next show that for the general case λmax < ∞, the
evolutionary dynamics also globally converges to the ESS
equilibrium as given in (7).
D. Evolutionary Equilibrium in General Case λmax <∞
For the general case λmax, since the channel grabbing
probability g(k) does not have the close-form expression,
it is hence difficult to obtain the equilibrium solution of
differential equations in (4). However, it is easy to verify that
the equilibrium x∗ in (7) is also a stationary point such that
the evolutionary dynamics (4) in the general case λmax <∞
satisfy x˙m(t) = 0. Thus, at the equilibrium x∗, users on
different channels achieve the same expected throughput.
We now study the evolutionary stability of the equilibrium.
In general, the equilibrium of the replicator dynamics may not
be an ESS [22]. For our model, we can prove the following.
Theorem 3. For the evolutionary spectrum access mechanism,
the evolutionary equilibrium x∗ in (7) is an ESS.
The proof is given in Section VIII-D. Actually we can
obtain a stronger result than Theorem 3. Typically, an ESS is
only locally asymptotically stable (i.e., stable within a limited
region around the ESS) [22]. For our case, we show that the
evolutionary equilibrium x∗ is globally asymptotically stable
(i.e., stable in the entire feasible region of a population state
x, {x = (xm,m ∈ M)|
∑M
m=1 xm = 1 and xm ≥ 0, ∀m ∈
M}).
To proceed, we first define the following function
L(x) =
M∑
m=1
∫ xm
−∞
θmBmg(Nz)dz. (8)
Since g(·) is a decreasing function, it is easy to check that
the Hessian matrix of L(x) is negative definite. It follows that
L(x) is strictly concave and hence has a unique global max-
imum L∗. By the first order condition, we obtain the optimal
solution x∗, which is the same as the evolutionary equilibrium
x∗ in (7). Then by showing that V (x(t)) = L∗ − L(x(t)) is
a strict Lyapunov function, we have
Theorem 4. For the evolutionary spectrum access mechanism,
the evolutionary equilibrium x∗ in (7) is globally asymptoti-
cally stable.
The proof is given in the Appendix. Since the ESS is glob-
ally asymptotically stable, the evolutionary spectrum access
mechanism is robust to any degree of (not necessarily small)
random perturbations of channel selections.
5Algorithm 2 Learning Mechanism For Distributed Spectrum
Access
1: initialization:
2: set the global memory weight γ ∈ (0, 1) and the set
of accessed channels Mn = ∅ for each user n.
3: end initialization
4: loop for each user n ∈ N in parallel:
⊲ Initial Channel Estimation Stage
5: while Mn 6=M do
6: choose a channel m from the set Mcn randomly.
7: sense and contend to access the channel m at each
time slot of the decision period.
8: estimate the expected throughput U˜m,n(0) by (9).
9: set Mn =Mn ∪ {m}.
10: end while
⊲ Access Strategy Learning Stage
11: for for each time period T do
12: choose a channel m to access according to the
mixed strategy fn(T ) in (10).
13: sense and contend to access the channel m at each
time slot of the decision period.
14: estimate the qualities of the chosen channel m
and the unchosen channels m′ 6= m by (12) and (11),
respectively.
15: end for
16: end loop
V. LEARNING MECHANISM FOR DISTRIBUTED SPECTRUM
ACCESS
For the evolutionary spectrum access mechanism in Section
IV, we assume that each user has the perfect knowledge
of channel statistics and the population state by information
exchange on a common control channel. Such mechanism
leads to significant communication overhead and energy con-
sumption, and may even be impossible in some systems. We
thus propose a learning mechanism for distributed spectrum
access with incomplete information. The challenge is how to
achieve the evolutionarily stable state based on user’s local
observations only.
A. Learning Mechanism For Distributed Spectrum Access
The proposed learning process is shown in Algorithm 2 and
has two sequential stages: initial channel estimation (line 5 to
10) and access strategy learning (line 11 to 15). Each stage
is defined over a sequence of decision periods T = 1, 2, ...,
where each decision period consists of tmax time slots (see
Figure 2 as an illustration).
The key idea of distributed learning here is to adapt each
user’s spectrum access decision based on its accumulated
experiences. In the first stage, each user initially estimates
the expected throughput by accessing all the channels in a
randomized round-robin manner. This ensures that all users
do not choose the same channel at the same period. Let Mn
Fig. 2. Learning time structure
(equals to ∅ initially) be the set of channels accessed by user
n and Mcn =M\Mn. At beginning of each decision period,
user n randomly chooses a channel m ∈Mcn (i.e., a channel
that has not been accessed before) to access. At end of the
period, user n can estimate the expected throughput by sample
averaging as
Zm,n(0) = (1− γ)
∑tmax
t=1 bm(t)I{an(t,T )=m}
tmax
, (9)
where 0 < γ < 1 is called the memory weight and
I{an(t,T )=m} is an indicator function and equals 1 if the
channel m is idle at time slot t and the user n chooses and
successfully grabs the channel m. Motivation of multiplying
(1 − γ) in (9) is to scale down the impact of the noisy
instantaneous estimation on the learning. Note that there are
tmax time slots within each decision period, and thus the user
will be able to have a fairly good estimation of the expected
throughput if tmax is reasonably large. Then user n updates
the set of accessed channels as Mn =Mn ∪ {m}. When all
the channels are accessed, i.e., Mn =M, the stage of initial
channel estimation ends. Thus, the total time slots for the first
stage is Mtmax.
In the second stage, at each period T ≥ 1, each user
n ∈ N selects a channel m to access according to a mixed
strategy fn(T ) = (f1,n(T ), ..., fM,n(T )), where fm,n(T ) is
the probability of user n choosing channel m and is computed
as
fm,n(T ) =
∑T−1
τ=0 γ
T−τ−1Zm,n(τ)∑M
i=1
∑T−1
τ=0 γ
T−τ−1Zi,n(τ)
, ∀m ∈ M. (10)
Here Zm,n(τ) is user n’s estimation of the quality of channel
m at period τ (see (11) and(12) later). The update in (10)
means that each user adjusts its mixed strategy according to
its weighted average estimations of all channels’ qualities.
Suppose that user n chooses channel m to access at period
τ . For the unchosen channels m′ 6= m at this period, user n
can empirically estimate the quality of this channel according
to its past memories as
Zm′,n(τ) = (1− γ)
τ−1∑
τ
′=0
γτ−τ
′
−1Zm′,n(τ
′
). (11)
For the chosen channel m, user n will update the estimation
of this channel m by combining the empirical estimation with
the real-time throughput measurement in this period, i.e.,
Zm,n(τ) =(1− γ)

 τ−1∑
τ
′=0
γτ−τ
′
−1Zm,n(τ
′
)
6+
∑tmax
t=1 bm(t)I{an(t,τ)=m}
tmax
)
. (12)
B. Convergence of Learning Mechanism
We now study the convergence of the learning mechanism.
Since each user only utilizes its local estimation to adjust its
mixed channel access strategy, the exact ESS is difficult to
achieve due to the random estimation noise. We will show
that the learning mechanism can converge to the ESS on time
average.
According to the theory of stochastic approximation [25],
the limiting behaviors of the learning mechanism with the
random estimation noise can be well approximated by the
corresponding mean dynamics. We thus study the mean dy-
namics of the learning mechanism. To proceed, we define the
mapping from the mixed channel access strategies f (T ) =
(f1(T ), ...,fN (T )) to the mean throughput of user n choosing
channel m as Qm,n(f(T )) , E[Un(m,x(T ))|f(T )]. Here
the expectation E[·] is taken with respective to the mixed
strategies f (T ) of all users. We show that
Theorem 5. As the memory weight γ → 1, the mean dynamics
of the learning mechanism for distributed spectrum access are
given as (∀m ∈ M, n ∈ N )
f˙m,n(T ) = fm,n(T )
(
Qm,n(f (T ))−
M∑
i=1
fi,n(T )Qi,n(f (T ))
)
,
(13)
where the derivative is with respect to period T .
The proof is given in Section VIII-E. Interestingly, similarly
with the evolutionary dynamics in (4), the learning dynamics
in (13) imply that if a channel offers a higher throughput for
a user than the user’s average throughput over all channels,
then the user will exploit that channel more often in the future
learning. However, the evolutionary dynamics in (4) are based
on the population level with complete network information,
while the learning dynamics in (13) are derived from the
individual local estimations. We show in Theorem 6 that the
mean dynamics of learning mechanism converge to the ESS
in (7), i.e., Qm,n(f∗) = Qm′,n(f∗).
Theorem 6. As the memory weight γ → 1, the mean dynamics
of the learning mechanism for distributed spectrum access
asymptotically converge to a limiting point f∗ such that
Qm,n(f
∗) = Qm′,n(f
∗), ∀m,m′ ∈ M, ∀n ∈ N . (14)
The proof is given in Section VIII-F. Since Qm,n(f∗) =
E[Un(m,x(T ))|f
∗] and the mean dynamics converge to the
equilibrium f∗ satisfying (14) (i.e., E[Un(m,x(T ))|f∗] =
E[Un(m
′,x(T ))|f∗]), the learning mechanism thus converges
to the ESS (7) (achieved by the evolutionary spectrum access
mechanism) on the time average. Note that both the evolution-
ary spectrum access mechanism in Algorithm 1 and learning
mechanism in Algorithm 2 involve basic arithmetic operations
and random number generation over M channels, and hence
have a linear computational complexity of O(M) for each
iteration. However, due to the incomplete information, the
Fig. 3. The iterations need for the convergence of the evolutionary spectrum
accessing mechanism with different choices of strategy adaptation factor α.
The confidence interval is 95%.
learning mechanism typically takes a longer convergence time
in order to get a good estimation of the environment.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we evaluate the proposed algorithms by
simulations. We consider a cognitive radio network consisting
M = 5 Rayleigh fading channels. The channel idle proba-
bilities are {θm}Mm=1 = { 23 ,
4
7 ,
5
9 ,
1
2 ,
4
5}. The data rate on a
channel m is computed according to the Shannon capacity,
i.e., bm = ζm log2(1 + PnhmN0 ), where ζm is the bandwidth
of channel m, Pn is the power adopted by users, N0 is the
noise power, and hm is the channel gain (a realization of a
random variable that follows the exponential distribution with
the mean h¯m). In the following simulations, we set ζm = 10
MHz, N0 = −100 dBm, and Pn = 100 mW. By choosing
different mean channel gain h¯m, we have different mean data
rates Bm = E[bm], which equal 15, 70, 90, 20 and 100 Mbps,
respectively.
A. Evolutionary Spectrum Access in Large User Population
Case
We first study the evolutionary spectrum mechanism with
complete network information in Section IV with a large
user population. We found that the convergence speed of
the evolutionary spectrum access mechanism increases as the
strategy adaptation factor α increases (see Figure 3). We set the
strategy adaptation factor α = 0.5 in the following simulations
in order to better demonstrate the evolutionary dynamics. We
implement the evolutionary spectrum access mechanism with
the number of users N = 100 and 200, respectively, in both
large and small λmax cases.
1) Large λmax Case: We first consider the case that the
number of backoff mini-slots λmax = 100000, which is much
larger that the number of users N and thus collisions in chan-
nel contention rarely occur. This case can be approximated
7Fig. 4. The fraction of users on each channel and the expected user payoff
of accessing different channels with the number of users N = 100 and 200,
respectively, and the number of backoff mini-slots λmax = 100000.
Fig. 5. Stability of the evolutionary spectrum access mechanism. Fraction
of users in total N = 200 users who choose mutant channels randomly at
time slot 30 equal to 0.5 and 0.9, respectively, and the number of backoff
mini-slots λmax = 100000.
by the asymptotic case λmax = ∞ in Section IV-C. The
simulation results are shown in Figures 4 and 5. From these
figures, we see that
• Fast convergence: the algorithm takes less than 20 itera-
tions to converge in all cases (see Figure 4).
• Convergence to ESS: in both N = 100 and 200
cases, the algorithm converges to the ESS x∗ =(
θ1B1∑
M
i=1 θiBi
, ..., θMBM∑M
i=1 θiBi
)
(see Figure the left column of
4). At the ESS x∗, each user achieves the same expected
payoff Un(a∗n,x∗) =
∑
M
i=1 θiBi
N
(see the right column of
Figure 4).
• Asymptotic stability: to investigate the stability of the evo-
lutionary spectrum access mechanism, we let a fraction
of users play the mutant strategies when the system is at
the ESS x∗. At time slot t = 30, ǫ = 0.5 and 0.9 fraction
Fig. 6. The fraction of users on each channel and the expected user payoff
of accessing different channels with the number of users N = 100 and 200,
respectively, and the number of backoff mini-slots λmax = 20.
Fig. 7. Stability of the evolutionary spectrum access mechanism. Fraction
of users in total N = 200 users who choose mutant channels randomly at
time slot 30 equal to 0.5 and 0.9, respectively, and the number of backoff
mini-slots λmax = 20.
of users will randomly choose a new channel. The result
is shown in Figure 5. We see that the algorithm is capable
to recover the ESS x∗ quickly after the mutation occurs.
This demonstrates that the evolutionary spectrum access
mechanism is robust to the perturbations in the network.
2) Small λmax Case: We now consider the case that the
number of backoff mini-slots λmax = 20, which is smaller
than the number of users N . In this case, severe collisions in
channel contention may occur and hence lead to a reduction in
data rates for all users. The results are shown in Figures 6 and
7. We see that a small λmax leads to a system performance loss
(i.e.,∑Nn=1 Un(an(T ),x(T )) <∑Mm=1 θmBm), due to severe
collisions in channel contention. However, the evolutionary
spectrum access mechanism still quickly converges to the ESS
8Fig. 8. Learning mechanism for distributed spectrum access with the number
of users N = 100 and 200, respectively, and the number of backoff mini-slots
λmax = 100000.
as given in (7) such that all users achieve the same expected
throughput, and the asymptotic stable property also holds. This
verifies the efficiency of the mechanism in the small λmax
case.
B. Distributed Learning Mechanism in Large User Population
Case
We next evaluate the learning mechanism for distributed
spectrum access with a large user population. We implement
the learning mechanism with the number of users N = 100
and N = 200, respectively, in both large and small λmax
cases. We set the memory factor γ = 0.99 and the length of
a decision period tmax = 100 time slots, which provides a
good estimation of the mean data rate. Figures 8 and 9 show
the time average user distribution on the channels converges
to the ESS, and the time average user’s payoff converges the
expected payoff at the ESS. Note that users achieve this result
without prior knowledge of the statistics of the channels, and
the number of users utilizing each channel keeps changing in
the learning scheme.
C. Evolutionary Spectrum Access and Distributed Learning in
Small User Population Case
We then consider the case that the user population N is
small. We implement the proposed evolutionary spectrum ac-
cess mechanism and distributed learning mechanism with the
number of users N = 4 and the number of backoff mini-slots
λmax = 20. The results are shown in Figure 10. We see that
the evolutionary spectrum access mechanism converges to the
equilibrium such that channel 5 has 2 users and both channel
1 and 2 have 1 user. These 4 users achieve the expected
throughput equal to 50, 40, 38 and 38 Mbps, respectively, at
the equilibrium. It is easy to check that any user unilaterally
changes its channel selection at the equilibrium will lead to
a loss in throughput, hence the equilibrium is a strict Nash
equilibrium. According to [22], any strict Nash equilibrium
Fig. 9. Learning mechanism for distributed spectrum access with the number
of users N = 100 and 200, respectively, and the number of backoff mini-slots
λmax = 20.
Fig. 10. Evolutionary spectrum access and Learning mechanism for dis-
tributed spectrum access with the number of users N = 4, and the number
of backoff mini-slots λmax = 20.
is also an ESS and hence the convergent equilibrium is an
ESS. For the distributed learning mechanism, we see that the
mechanism also converges to the same equilibrium on the
time average. This verifies that effectiveness of the proposed
mechanisms in the small user population case.
D. Performance Comparison
To benchmark the performance of the proposed mecha-
nisms, we compare them with the following two algorithms:
• Centralized optimization: we solve the centralized opti-
mization problem maxx
∑N
n=1 Un(an,x), i.e., find the
optimal population state xopt that maximizes the system
throughput.
9• Distributed reinforcement learning: we also implement
the distributed algorithm in [16] by generalizing the
single-agent reinforcement learning to the multi-agent
setting. More specifically, each user n maintains a per-
ception value Pnm(T ) to describe the performance of
channel m, and select the channel m with the probability
fm,n(T ) =
eνP
n
m(T )
∑
M
m′=1
e
νPn
m′
(T ) where ν is called the temper-
ature. Once a payoff Un(T ) is received, user n updates
the perception value as Pnm(T +1) = (1− µT )Pnm(T ) +
µTUn(T )I{an(T )=m} where µT is the smooth factor
satisfying
∑∞
T=1 µT = ∞ and
∑∞
T=1 µ
2
T < ∞. As
shown in [16], when ν is sufficiently large, the algorithm
converges to a stationary point. We hence set µT = 100T
and ν = 10 in the simulation, which guarantees the
convergence and achieves a good system performance.
Since the proposed learning mechanism in this paper can
converge to the same equilibrium as the evolutionary spec-
trum access mechanism, we only implement the evolutionary
spectrum access mechanism in this experiment. The results
are shown in Figure 11. Since the global optimum by cen-
tralized optimization and the ESS by evolutionary spectrum
access are deterministic, only the confidence interval of the
distributed reinforcement learning is shown here. We see that
the evolutionary spectrum access mechanism achieves up to
35% performance improvement over the distributed reinforce-
ment learning algorithm. Compared with the centralized opti-
mization approach, the performance loss of the evolutionary
spectrum access mechanism is at most 38%. When the number
of users N is small (e.g., N ≤ 50), the performance loss can
be further reduced to less than 25%. Note that the solution
by the centralized optimization is not incentive compatible,
since it is not a Nash equilibrium and user can improve its
payoff by changing its channel selection unilaterally. While
the evolutionary spectrum access mechanism achieves an ESS,
which is also a (strict) Nash equilibrium and evolutionarily
stable. Interestingly, the curve of the evolutionary spectrum
access mechanism in Figure 11 achieves a local minimum
when the number of users N = 5. This can be interpreted
by the property of the Nash equilibrium. When the number of
users N = 4, these four users will utilize the three channels
with high data rate (i.e., Channel 2, 3, and 5 in the simulation).
When the number of users N = 5, the same three channels
are utilized at the Nash equilibrium. In this case, there will be
a system performance loss due to severer channel contention.
However, no user at the equilibrium is willing to switch to
another vacant channel, since the remaining vacant channels
have low data rates and such a switch will incurs a loss to the
user. When the number of users N = 8, all given channels are
utilized at the Nash equilibrium, and this improves the system
performance.
E. Distributed Learning Mechanism In Markovian Channel
Environment
For the ease of exposition, we have considered the i.i.d.
channel model as far. We now consider the proposed mech-
anisms in the Markovian channel environment. Since in the
evolutionary spectrum access mechanism each user has the
Fig. 11. Comparison of the evolutionary spectrum access mechanism
with the distributed reinforcement learning and centralized optimization. The
confidence interval is 95%.
Fig. 12. Two states Markovian channel model
complete information aprior (including the stationary distri-
bution that a channel is idle), the Markovian setting will not
affect the evolutionary spectrum access mechanism. We hence
focus on evaluating the learning mechanism.
We consider a network of N = 100 users and M = 10
channels. The states of channels change according to inde-
pendent Markovian processes (see Figure 12). We denote the
channel state probability vector of channel m at time slot t as
pm(t) , (Pr{Sm(t) = 0, P r{Sm(t) = 1}}), which follows
a two state Markov chain as pm(t) = pm(t − 1)Γ, ∀t ≥ 1,
with the transition matrix
Γ =
[
1− p p
q 1− q
]
.
For the simulation, we set p = q = ǫ, where ǫ is called the
dynamic factor. A larger ǫ means that the channel state changes
faster over time. The mean data rates Bm of 10 channels are
10, 40, 50, 20, 80, 60, 15, 25, 30, and 70 Mbps, respectively.
We first set the dynamic factor ǫ = 0.3, and study the
learning mechanism with the different memory weights γ =
0.99, 0.8, 0.5, and 0.1, respectively. The results are shown in
Figure 13. We see that a large enough memory weight (e.g.,
γ ≥ 0.8) is needed to guarantee that the mechanism converges
to the ESS equilibrium. When the memory weight is large, the
noise of the local estimation by each user can be averaged out
in the long run, and hence each user can achieve an accurate
estimation of the environment. When the memory weight is
10
Fig. 13. Distributed learning mechanism with different memory weights γ
Fig. 14. Distributed learning mechanism with the memory weight γ = 0.99
in the Markovian channel environment with different dynamic factors ǫ
small, the most recent estimations will have a great impact
on the learning. This means that the learning mechanism will
over-exploit the current best channels, and get stuck in a local
optimum.
We next set the memory weight γ = 0.99, and investigate
the learning mechanism in the Markovian channel environ-
ments with different dynamic factors ǫ = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, and
0.7, respectively. The results are shown in Figure 14. We see
that the learning mechanism can converge to the ESS in all
cases. This demonstrates that the learning mechanism is robust
to the dynamic channel state changing.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study the problem of distributed spec-
trum access of multiple time-varying heterogeneous licensed
channels, and propose an evolutionary spectrum access mech-
anism based on evolutionary game theory. We show that
the equilibrium of the mechanism is an evolutionarily stable
strategy and is globally stable. We further propose a learning
mechanism, which requires no information exchange among
the users. We show that the learning mechanism converges
to the evolutionarily stable strategy on the time average.
Numerical results show that the proposed mechanisms can
achieve efficient and stable spectrum sharing among the users.
One possible direction of extending this result is to consider
heterogeneous users, i.e. each user may achieve different mean
data rates on the same channel. Another interesting direction
is to take the spatial reuse effect into account. How to design
an efficient evolutionarily stable spectrum access mechanism
with spatial reuse will be challenging.
VIII. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 1
Given a population state x(t) = (x1(t), ..., xM (t)),
we divide the set of channels M into the following
three complete and mutually exclusive subsets: M1 =
{m ∈ M|θmBmg(Nxm(t)) < U(x(t))}, M2 = {m ∈
M|θmBmg(Nxm(t)) = U(x(t))}, and M3 = {m ∈
M|θmBmg(Nxm(t)) > U(x(t))}.
For a channel m ∈ M1, each user n on this channel
achieves an expected payoff less than the system average
payoff, i.e., Un(m,x(t)) = θmBmg(Nxm(t)) < U(x(t)).
According to the mechanism, each user has a probability of
α
xm(t)
(
1− Un(m,x(t))
U(x(t))
)
to move out of the channel m. Since
θmBmg(Nxm(t)) < U(x(t)), it follows that pm = 0 and
hence no other users will move into this channel. Thus, the
dynamics are given as
x˙m(t) = −
α
xm(t)
(
1−
Un(m,x(t))
U(x(t))
)
xm(t)
= α
(
Un(m,x(t))
U(x(t))
− 1
)
, ∀m ∈M2.
For a channel m ∈ M2, we have Un(m,x(t)) = U(x(t))
and pm = 0. Thus, x˙m(t) = 0, which satisfies the conclusion.
For a channel m ∈ M3, each user n on this channel
achieves an expected payoff higher than the system average
payoff, i.e., Un(m,x(t)) = θmBmg(Nxm(t)) > U(x(t)).
According to the mechanism, no users will move out of the
channel m. Since pm > 0, there will be some other users from
the channel m′ ∈ M1 moving into this channel. Let ω be the
fraction of population that carries out the movement. We have
ω =
∑
m′∈M1
(xm′(t)− xm′(t+ 1))
=
∑
m′∈M1
α
(
1−
Un(m
′,x(t))
U(x(t))
)
=
∑
m′∈M1
α
U(x(t))
(U(x(t))− Un(m
′,x(t)))
=
α
U(x(t))
∑
m′∈M1
(U(x(t))− θm′Bm′g(Nxm′(t))) .
Since θm′Bm′g(Nxm′(t)) = U(x(t)) for each channel m′ ∈
M2, and
∑
m′∈M (U(x(t))− θm′Bm′g(Nxm′(t))) = 0, we
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then obtaion∑
m′∈M1
(U(x(t))− θm′Bm′g(Nxm′(t)))
=
∑
m′∈M3
(θm′Bm′g(Nxm′(t)) − U(x(t))) .
Then, the fraction of the population moving into a channel
m ∈M3 thus is
x˙m(t) = pmω
=
(θmBmg(Nxm(t)) − U(x(t)))∑
m′∈M3
(θm′Bm′g(Nxm′(t)) − U(x(t)))
×
α
U(x(t))
∑
m′∈M3
(θm′Bm′g(Nxm′(t)) − U(x(t)))
=α
(
Un(m,x(t))
U(x(t))
− 1
)
, ∀m ∈M3.
This completes the proof.
B. Proof of Theorem 2
First, it is easy to check that when xm(t) = x∗m =
θmBm∑
M
i=1 θiBi
, we have x˙m(t) = 0 in the evolutionary dynamics
(6). Thus, x(t) is the equilibrium of the evolutionary dynam-
ics.
We then apply Lyapunov’s second method [26] to
prove that the equilibrium x∗ is globally asymptotic sta-
ble. We use the following Lyapunov function V (x(t)) =
−
∑M
m=1 x
∗
m ln
xm(t)
x∗m
. By Jensen’s inequality, we first have
for any x(t) 6= x∗
V (x(t)) > − ln
(
M∑
m=1
x∗m
xm(t)
x∗m
)
= − ln
(
M∑
m=1
xm(t)
)
= 0.
Thus, we obtain that V (x∗) = 0 and V (x(t)) > 0 for any
x(t) 6= x∗.
We then consider the time derivative of V (x(t)) as
dV (x(t))
dt
=−
M∑
m=1
∂V (x(t))
∂xm(t)
x˙m(t) = −
M∑
m=1
x∗m
xm(t)
x˙m(t)
=−
α
1
M
∑M
i=1
θiBi
xi(t)
M∑
m=1
x∗m
xm(t)
(
θmBm
xm(t)
−
1
M
M∑
i=1
θiBi
xi(t)
)
=−
α
M
(∑M
j=1 θjBj
)(
1
M
∑M
i=1
θiBi
xi(t)
)
×
(
M
M∑
m=1
(
θmBm
xm(t)
)2
−
M∑
m=1
M∑
i=1
θmBm
xm(t)
θiBi
xi(t)
)
=−
α(∑M
j=1 θjBj
)(∑M
i=1
θiBi
xi(t)
)
×
M∑
m=1
M∑
i=1
(
θmBm
xm(t)
−
θiBi
xi(t)
)2
.
Thus, we must have that dV (x
∗)
dt
= 0 and dV (x(t))
dt
< 0 for
any x(t) 6= x∗, which completes the proof.
According to [22], any strict Nash equilibrium is also an
ESS and hence the equilibrium x∗ is an ESS.
C. Proof of Theorem 4
According to Lyapunov’s second method [26], we prove the
global asymptotic stability by using the following Lyapunov
function V (x(t)) = L∗ − L(x(t)). Since L∗ is the unique
global maximum of L(x(t)) achieved at x∗, we thus have
V (x(t)) > 0, ∀x(t) 6= x∗,
V (x∗) = 0.
Then differentiating V (x(t)) with respective to time t, we
have
V˙ (x(t))
= −
M∑
m=1
Bmg(Nxm)x˙m(t)
= −
M∑
m=1
Un(m,x(t))x˙m(t)
= −
M∑
m=1
Un(m,x(t))
α
U(x(t))
(Un(m,x(t)) − U(x(t)))
= −
α
MU(x(t))
(
M
M∑
m=1
(Un(m,x(t)))
2
−
M∑
m=1
Un(m,x(t))
M∑
m′=1
Un(m
′,x(t))
)
= −
α
MU(x(t))
M∑
m=1
M∑
m′=1
(Un(m,x(t))− Un(m
′,x(t)))
2
Thus, we obtain that
V˙ (x(t)) < 0, ∀x(t) 6= x∗,
V˙ (x∗) = 0,
which completes the proof.
D. Proof of Theorem 3
We first show that the solution in (7) is an equilibrium
for the evolution dynamics in (4). Since Un(m,x∗) =
Un(m
′,x∗) for any m,m′ ∈ M, it follows that U(x∗) =
1
M
∑M
i=1 Un(i,x
∗) = Un(m,x
∗) for any m ∈ M. Hence
x˙m = α(
Un(m,x
∗)
U(x∗) − 1) = 0, which is an equilibrium for the
evolution dynamics in (4).
We next show that the equilibrium x∗ is a strict Nash
equilibrium. The expected payoff of a user n ∈ N at the
equilibrium population state x∗ is given by Un(a∗n,x∗) =
θa∗nBa∗ng(Nx
∗
a∗n
), where a∗n is the channel chosen by user n
in the population state x∗. Now suppose that user n makes
an unilateral deviation to another channel an 6= a∗n, and
the population state becomes x′ = (x∗1, ..., x∗a∗n−1, x
∗
a∗n
−
1
N
, x∗a∗n+1, ..., x
∗
an−1, x
∗
an
+ 1
N
, x∗an+1, ..., x
∗
N ). Then its ex-
pected payoff becomes Un(an,x′) = θanBang(Nx∗an +
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1) < θanBang(Nx
∗
an
). For the equilibrium x∗, we
have θa∗nBa∗ng(Nx
∗
a∗n
) = θanBang(Nx
∗
an
). It follows that
Un(a
∗
n,x
∗) > Un(an,x
′), ∀an 6= a∗n, n ∈ N , which is a strict
Nash equilibrium.
E. Proof of Theorem 5
The key idea of the proof is to first obtain the discrete
time dynamics of the learning mechanism, and then derive
the corresponding mean continuous time dynamics.
For simplicity, we first define that
Am,n(T ) =
T−1∑
τ=0
γT−τ−1Zm,n(τ)
and
Cn(T ) =
∑tmax
t=1 bi(t)I{an(t,T )=an(T )}
tmax
,
where I{an(t,T )=an(T )} indicates whether user n successfully
grabs the chosen channel an(T ), and hence Cn(T ) denotes
the average throughput it received at period T . According to
(11) and (12), we have
Am,n(T + 1) = Zm,n(T ) + γ
T−1∑
τ=0
γT−τ−1Zm,n(τ)
=(1 − γ)Cn(T )I{an(T )=m} + (1 − γ)
T−1∑
τ=0
γT−τ−1Zm,n(τ)
+ γ
T−1∑
τ=0
γT−τ−1Zm,n(τ)
=(1 − γ)Cn(T )I{an(T )=m} +
T−1∑
τ=0
γT−τ−1Zm,n(τ)
=(1 − γ)Cn(T )I{an(T )=m} +Am,n(T ),
where I{an(T )=m} indicates whether user n chooses channel
m in period T . Then the mixed strategy update in (10)
becomes
fm,n(T + 1) =
Am,n(T + 1)∑M
i=1 Ai,n(T + 1)
=
Am,n(T ) + (1− γ)Cn(T )I{an(T )=m}∑M
i=1 Ai,n(T ) + (1− γ)Cn(T )
,
For the chosen channel j (i.e., I{an(T )=j} = 1), we further
have
fj,n(T + 1) =
Aj,n(T )∑M
i=1 Ai,n(T ) + (1− γ)Cn(T )
(15)
+
(1− γ)Cn(T )∑M
i=1Ai,n(T ) + (1− γ)Cn(T )
=
Aj,n(T )∑M
i=1 Ai,n(T )
∑M
i=1 Ai,n(T )∑M
i=1Ai,n(T ) + (1− γ)Cn(T )
+
(1− γ)Cn(T )∑M
i=1Ai,n(T ) + (1− γ)Cn(T )
=fj,n(T )
(
1−
(1 − γ)Cn(T )∑M
i=1 Ai,n(T ) + (1 − γ)Cn(T )
)
+
(1− γ)Cn(T )∑M
i=1 Ai,n(T ) + (1− γ)Cn(T )
. (16)
Let β(T ) = (1−γ)∑M
i=1 Ai,n(T )+(1−γ)Cn(T )
, and (16) can be ex-
presses as
fj,n(T +1) = fj,n(T )(1−β(T )Cn(T ))+β(T )Cn(T ). (17)
Similarly, for the unchosen channel j′(i.e., I{an(T )=j′} = 0),
we have
fj′,n(T + 1) = fj′,n(T )(1− β(T )Cn(T )). (18)
According to (17) and (18), we thus obtain the discrete time
learning dynamics as
fm,n(T + 1)− fm,n(T ) = β(T )Cn(T )(I{an(T )=m} − fm,n(T )).
(19)
Since β(T ) → 0 as γ → 1, by the theory of stochastic
approximation (Theorem 3.2) in [25], the limiting behavior of
the stochastic difference equations in (19) is the same as its
mean continuous time dynamics by taking the expectation on
RHS of (19) with respective to f(T ), i.e.,
f˙m,n(T ) = E[Cn(T )(I{an(T )=m} − fm,n(T ))|f(T )]
=(1− fm,n(T ))E[Cn(T )|an(t) = m,f(T )]fm,n(T )
− fm,n(T )
∑
i6=m
E[Cn(T )|an(t) = i,f(T )]fi,n(T ). (20)
Since Cn(T ) is the sample averaging estimation of the
expected throughput of the chosen channel, by the central
limit theorem, we have E[Cn(T )|an(t) = m,f(T )] =
E[Un(an(t) = m,x(T ))|f(T )] = Qm,n(f (T )). Then the
mean dynamics in (20) can be written as
f˙m,n(T ) = Qm,n(f (T ))(1− fm,n(T ))fm,n(T )
− fm,n(T )
∑
i6=m
Qi,n(f(T ))fi,n(T )
=fm,n(T )
(
Qm,n(f (T ))−
M∑
i=1
Qi,n(f (T ))fi,n(T )
)
,
which completes the proof.
F. Proof of Theorem 6
We first denote the following function
Φ(f(T )) = E[
M∑
i=1
∫ xi(T )
−∞
θiBig(Nz)dz|f(T )],
and
Φm,n(f(T )) = E[
M∑
i=1
∫ xi(T )
−∞
θiBig(Nz)dz|an(T ) = m,f(T )].
Obviously, we have
Φ(f(T )) =
M∑
m=1
Φm,n(f (T ))fm,n(T ).
We further denote x−n(T ) , (x−nm (T ),m ∈ M) as the pop-
ulation state of all other users without user n. By considering
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the user distributions on the chosen channel m by user n and
the other channels, we then have
Φm,n(f (T ))
=E[
M∑
i=1
∫ xi(T )
−∞
θiBig(Nz)dz|an(T ) = m,f(T )]
=
∑
x−n(T )
E[
∑
i6=m
∫ x−n
i
(T )
−∞
θiBig(Nz)dz
+
∫ x−nm (T )+ 1N
−∞
θmBmg(Nz)dz|an(T ) = m,x−n(T )]
× Pr{x−n(T )|f(T )}
=
∑
x−n(T )

∑
i6=m
∫ x−n
i
(T )
−∞
θiBig(Nz)dz
+
∫ x−nm (T )+ 1N
−∞
θmBmg(Nz)dz
)
Pr{x−n(T )|f(T )}.
(21)
Similarly, we can obtain
Φm′,n(f(T )) =
∑
x−n(T )

∑
i6=m′
∫ x−n
i
(T )
−∞
θiBig(Nz)dz
+
∫ x−n
m′
(T )+ 1
N
−∞
θm′Bm′g(Nz)dz
)
Pr{x−n(T )|f(T )}.
(22)
It follows that
Φm,n(f (T ))− Φm′,n(f (T ))
=
∑
x−n(T )

∑
i6=m
∫ x−n
i
(T )
−∞
θiBig(Nz)dz
+
∫ x−nm (T )+ 1N
−∞
θmBmg(Nz)dz
)
Pr{x−n(T )|f(T )}
−
∑
x−n(T )

∑
i6=m′
∫ x−n
i
(T )
−∞
θiBig(Nz)dz
+
∫ x−n
m′
(T )+ 1
N
−∞
θm′Bm′g(Nz)dz
)
Pr{x−n(T )|f(T )}
=
∑
x−n(T )
(∫ x−nm (T )+ 1N
−∞
θmBmg(Nz)dz
−
∫ x−nm (T )
−∞
θmBmg(Nz)
)
Pr{x−n(T )|f(T )}
−
∑
x−n(T )
(∫ x−n
m′
(T )+ 1
N
−∞
θm′Bm′g(Nz)dz
−
∫ x−n
m′
(T )
−∞
θm′Bm′g(Nz)
)
Pr{x−n(T )|f(T )}. (23)
Since N is large, we obtain that for i ∈ {m,m′}∫ x−n
i
(T )+ 1
N
−∞
θiBig(Nz)dz −
∫ x−n
i
(T )
−∞
θiBig(Nz)
=
∫ x−n
i
(T )+ 1
N
x
−n
i (T )
θiBig(Nz)dz =
∫ Nx−n
i
(T )+1
Nx
−n
i (T )
θiBig(z)dz
≈θiBig(Nx
−n
i (T ) + 1). (24)
According to (23) and (24), we have
Φm,n(f (T ))− Φm′,n(f (T ))
=
∑
x−n(T )
(
θmBmg(Nx
−n
m (T ) + 1)
− θm′Bm′g(Nx
−n
m′ (T ) + 1)
)
Pr{x−n(T )|f(T )}
=E[Un(an = m,x(t))|f (T )]− E[Un(an = m
′,x(t))|f (T )]
=Qm,n(f(T ))−Qm′,n(f(T )). (25)
We then consider the variation of Φ(f (T )) along the
trajectories of learning dynamics in (13), i.e., differentiating
Φ(f(T )) with respective to time T ,
dΦ(f (T ))
dT
=
M∑
m=1
dΦ(f (T ))
dfm,n(T )
dfm,n(T )
dT
=
M∑
m=1
Φm,n(f(T ))fm,n(T )
×
(
Qm,n(f (T ))−
M∑
i=1
fi,n(T )Qi,n(f (T ))
)
=
1
2
M∑
m=1
M∑
i=1
fm,n(T )fi,n(T )
× (Qm,n(f(T ))−Qi,n(f(T ))) (Φm,n(f (T ))− Φi,n(f(T )))
=
1
2
M∑
i=1
M∑
j=1
fi,n(T )fj,n(T ) (Qi,n(f (T ))−Qj,n(f (T )))
2
≥0. (26)
Hence Φ(f (T )) is non-decreasing along the trajectories of
the ODE (13). According to Theorem 2.7 in [26], the learning
mechanism asymptotically converges to a limit point f∗ such
that
dΦ(f∗)
dT
= 0, (27)
i.e., for any m, i ∈M, n ∈ N
f∗m,nf
∗
i,n (Qm,n(f
∗)−Qi,n(f
∗)) = 0. (28)
According to the mixed strategy update in (10), we know that
fm,n(T ) > 0 for any m ∈ M. Thus, from (28), we must have
Qm,n(f
∗) = Qi,n(f
∗).
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